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Introduction
Relatively early in the attempts to gender the discipline of International Relations
(IR), it was argued by some feminist scholars that it was easier to raise feminist
concerns in International Political Economy (IPE) than in IR.1 However, it has
subsequently proved very diﬃcult to articulate these concerns within mainstream
IPE, as ‘the neo-realist and neo-liberal frameworks, with their common focus on
state-centric issues of co-operation and conflict and their positivist and rationalistic
methodologies, do not lend themselves to investigating gendered structures of
inequality . . .’.2 In contrast, more overlap has been discerned between feminist
perspectives and methodologies and the less influential ‘globalist’ (also known as
critical/transdisciplinary or heterodox) approaches to IPE than with the dominant
statist approaches. This article takes this position as its starting point and will focus
on the relationship between gendered analyses and critical IPE (as it will be known
here). It therefore does not engage with the undoubtedly important question of how
far it is possible or desirable to have a gendered analysis that is not linked to
feminism, as within both feminist and critical approaches to IPE an emancipatory
agenda is entirely legitimate and even an integral part of those approaches.3
This article will argue that, despite some similarities in their ontologies and
epistemologies, and a commitment to pluralism, most critical IPE does not mention
gender except in passing or engage with any of the gendered political economy
debates and research, despite feminists’ attempts to engage in dialogue.4 At the
moment only an occasional token article or a few references to women are included
within critical IPE. Most analyses therefore remain gender-blind and over-simplistic,
oblivious to the complexity of the situations they analyse. Therefore, contrary to
* This title borrows from J. Ann Tickner’s article, ‘You Just Don’t Understand: Troubled
Engagements Between Feminists and IR Theorists’, International Studies Quarterly, 41 (1997),
pp. 611–632.
1 Sandra Whitworth, ‘Gender in the Inter-Paradigm Debate’, Millenium, 18:2 (1989), pp. 265–72.
2 J. Ann Tickner, Gendering World Politics: Issues and Approaches in the Post-Cold War Era (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2001), p. 66.
3 R. C. Carpenter, ‘Gender Theory in World Politics: Contributions of a Nonfeminist Standpoint?’,
International Studies Review, 4:3 (2002), pp. 153–65.
4 Marianne Marchand and Ann Sissons Runyan: see their edited collection Gender and Global
Restructuring: Sightings, Sites and Resistances (London: Routledge, 2000) as attempting to foster
dialogue between critical IPE and feminist IPE. J. Ann Tickner (see fn. 2 above) also argues that
feminist IR should maintain its connections to mainstream IR despite its lack of receptivity.
145
some assertions, critical IPE has not yet taken on gender as an analytical category in
any serious way.5 This situation continues despite the possibilities for gendered
analyses that exist within critical IPE as it is envisaged by many of its best-known
advocates. After examining these possibilities, this article explores, through an
analysis of the literature on globalisation, how and why this situation can exist, if, in
comparison to other variants of IPE (such as liberal or realist), critical IPE contains
the greatest possibilities for taking gender on board as an analytical category. It then
explores what has already been achieved by feminist scholars working in this area,
before outlining what more needs to be done to create a gendered IPE.
There is now a large body of work, sometimes identified as post-positivist or
post-rationalist, that sees itself as lying outside mainstream IPE. It has been
influenced by a range of diﬀerent perspectives including Foucauldian, post-structural
and post-colonial thought.6 Because of its heterogeneity, this article will concentrate
primarily on the ‘neo-Gramscian’ variant as the most influential strand within critical
IPE. Defined in this way, critical IPE and a developing gendered political economy
share a number of characteristics in terms of their approach and subject matter that
should mean that many of their analyses and approaches are compatible.7 In contrast
to the mainstream, critical IPE is based on ontologies that give primacy to the
construction of social relations and its epistemologies are sceptical of empiricism and
positivism. For example Robert Cox, one of the key figures in the development of
critical IPE, argued early on that one important task of IPE is to understand how
social structures, particularly structures of inequality, come into being and are
transformed.8 The emphasis is therefore on the importance of historically constituted
frameworks. It sees economic activity, markets and states as socially constructed.
The normative concerns of critical IPE are also very diﬀerent to those of the
mainstream. Stemming in part from an emphasis on structures of inequality is a
desire to understand how to transform those structures. As Cox famously argued,
critical IPE theorists believe that social theorising is ‘always for someone and for
some purpose’.9 It is, according to Murphy and Nelson, for those excluded from
decision-making in the world economy.10 Critical IPE is therefore oppositional and
particularly seeks to challenge ‘hyperliberalism’.11 In contrast to much mainstream
5 Craig Murphy and Dennis Nelson claim several times in ‘International Political Economy: A Tale
of Two Heterodoxies’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 3:3 (2001), pp. 393–412,
that ‘British’ (critical) IPE has focused more on the ‘contentious politics of gender’ (as well as race
and the environment) than has the American school of IPE. They cite (p. 400) as evidence, the
inclusion of feminist contributions as standard fare in ‘British’ School collections such as Craig
Murphy and Roger Tooze (eds.), The New International Political Economy (Boulder, CO: Lynn
Rienner, 2001); and Stephen Gill and James Mittelman (eds.), Innovation and Transformation in
International Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
6 See Lily Ling, Post Colonial International Relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002) and Ash Amin
and Ronen Palan, ‘Towards a Non-Rationalist International Political Economy’, Review of
International Political Economy, 8:4 (2002), pp. 559–77.
7 Birgit Locher and Elisabeth Prugl have argued something similar for feminist IR and
constructivism, see ‘Feminism and Constructivism: Worlds Apart or Sharing the Middle Ground?’,
International Studies Quarterly, 45 (2001), pp. 111–28.
8 Robert Cox, ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory’,
Millenium, 10:2 (1981), pp. 126–55.
9 Robert Cox, ‘Critical Political Economy’, in Bjorn Hettne (ed.), International Political Economy:
Understanding Global Disorder (London: Zed Press, 1995), p. 31.
10 Murphy and Nelson, ‘IPE’, p. 400.
11 Robert Cox, ‘The Way Ahead: Toward a New Ontology of World Order’, in Robert Wyn Jones
(ed.), Critical Theory and World Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2001), p. 48.
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IPE, although it emphasises structures, critical IPE also aims to be non-state centred,
moving away from the state/market frame of reference and giving greater prominence
to agency.12 It aims to highlight the roles played by non-state actors, including the
oppositional role played by social movements in resisting dominant structures.13
Critical IPE aims therefore to place a greater emphasis than mainstream IPE on the
role of ideas, ideology and identities.14 According to its proponents, critical IPE as a
result has to be multi-disciplinary if not trans/interdisciplinary, moving away from
just politics and economics to embrace a range of disciplines, methods and
approaches. One suggestion is that it should bring together the IPE that has emerged
from international relations with institutional economics and development studies to
form a ‘pluralism of heterodoxies’ that breaks away from the dominance of IPE by
the discipline of international relations.15
In recent years we have seen the growth of a gendered political economy that
shares a number of these traits with critical IPE.16 It, too, gives primacy to the
construction of social relations. Gender as a social construct is as ontologically
central to gendered political economy as it is to feminism. Indeed the majority of
those engaged in gendering all forms of political economy see themselves as feminists,
attempting not only to understand women’s subordination but also to change it, even
if the analyses and solutions advocated vary.17 All feminists recognise inequalities,
particularly gender inequalities, sharing a normative belief that the purpose of social
theorising is to help to challenge and transform those inequalities. In common with
other analyses informed by feminism, gendered political economy is also concerned
with asking what possibilities there are for change in the dominant gender order.
Many feminist analyses have therefore looked at the actions of non-state actors in
civil society, focusing particularly on the oppositional roles played by women’s
movements in their eﬀorts to change their situation. Therefore gendered political
economy is not state-centred like a lot of mainstream IPE, but also focuses on a
variety of women’s movements and their interactions with the state and governance
structures.
Gendered political economy, like critical IPE, is also concerned with historically
constituted frameworks or structures within which political and economic activity
take place, as well as with the nature of diﬀerent individuals and their actions. Until
quite recently much gendered political economy has concentrated on providing
gendered analyses at the micro-level, but calls have been made to integrate gender
issues into macroeconomics.18 Echoing some of the IPE work which uses Polanyi’s
notion of markets as embedded in wider social and cultural frameworks, ‘feminist
economic analyses of the macro-economy point to the gender biases of micro and
meso-level institutions, such as households, government agencies, firms and even
12 Ronen Palan, ‘New Trends in Global Political Economy’, in Ronen Palan (ed.), Global Political
Economy: Contemporary Theories (London: Routledge, 2000). pp. 1–18.
13 Robert O’Brien, ‘Labour and IPE: Rediscovering Human Agency’, in Palan, Global Political
Economy, pp. 89–99.
14 Amin and Palan, ‘Towards Non-Rationalist IPE’.
15 A. Amin, R. Palan and P. Taylor. ‘Forum for Heterodox International Political Economy’, Review
of International Political Economy, 1 (1994), pp. 1–12.
16 Joanne Cook, Jennifer Roberts and Georgina Waylen (eds.), Towards a Gendered Political Economy
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000).
17 G. Waylen, ‘Gender, Feminism and Political Economy’, New Political Economy, 2:2 (1997),
pp. 205–20.
18 L. Beneria, in ‘Towards Non-Rationalist IPE’.
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markets, from which macroeconomic outcomes emerge’.19 The economy is a
gendered structure, as is the state, which can act both to uphold and refashion
existing patterns of gender relations, for example by intervening in the market to
determine who can have rights over property and other economic assets. Markets,
too, as social institutions that embody social norms and practices, are imbued with
structural power relations that include a gender dimension.20 Gendered political
economy therefore also attempts to find ways around the old structure/agency
dichotomy that has characterised so much recent social science.
Many of those working within gendered political economy are also active in the
promotion and development of a feminist economics that has roots in economics but
also forms part of a critical political economy. Epistemologically it, too, is heterodox,
rejecting many of the key assumptions of neo-classical economics such as the rational
actor model and the public/private distinction, arguing for the need to analyse the
household and reproductive economy and for a more humane economics.21 In
common with other feminist analyses, gendered political economy therefore displays
a heterogeneity of approach and methodology, advocating interdisciplinarity and
pluralism in its analyses.22
These shared characteristics should mean that it is relatively easy for critical IPE
to fulfil its stated aims and incorporate gender into its frameworks. However, despite
some obvious commonalities in ontologies and epistemologies and a commitment to
using a wide variety of tools and methodologies (and a belief that this is achieved),
it is very rare to find critical IPE analyses that show much evidence of awareness of
gender as an important analytical category. Although it emphasises the importance
of social construction broadly defined, critical IPE has continued to focus on class as
the main axis of diﬀerentiation and inequality, while other axes such as gender and
race are still largely ignored. Therefore its analyses of the socially constructed nature
of institutions, markets and economic processes lack a gendered dimension. It focuses
primarily on abstract formal processes to the exclusion of the reproductive economy,
household and private sphere and the links between the two. Although there has been
some recognition from Cox and others that gender is missing from their analyses,
little has been done to rectify this omission.
This article will examine how and why this occurs. It will argue that, in part, this
omission stems from a misunderstanding of what using gender as an analytical
category means. As a result most critical IPE scholars cannot and do not do it.
Instead they appear to believe that it is enough to make some mention of women as
a group in a few contexts, often as activists in women’s movements or in terms of the
impact of a process on women. This is no more than a limited ‘adding women in’ to
existing analyses without changing any underlying categories and frameworks.
It is not to see gender as fundamentally constitutive of important processes. Indeed
even when women are mentioned, many studies see women as an often entirely
homogenous group, without recognising that other groups are gendered. For
19 N. Cagatay, D. Elson and C. Grown, ‘Introduction to Special Issue on Gender Adjustment and
Macroeconomics’, World Development, 23:11 (1995), p. 8929.
20 L. Beneria, ‘Globalization, Gender and Davos Man’, Feminist Economics, 5:3 (1999), pp. 61–83.
21 L. Beneria, ‘Toward a Greater Integration of Gender in Economics’, World Development, 23:11
(1995), pp. 1834–41.
22 G. Waylen, ‘Introduction to Special Section: Towards a Gendered Political Economy’, New Political
Economy, 3:2 (1998), pp. 181–9.
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example in an analysis of the agency of labour, O’Brien sees workers as gender-free
individuals with homogeneous interests and identities, rarely acknowledging in that
discussion that workers are diﬀerentially positioned according to a number of factors
including gender, race and sexuality as well as class.23 In short, it is not enough to
acknowledge that some women have played a role as activists, ignoring the gendered
nature of other groups, or just to examine the impact of certain processes on women,
seen as a homogenous group. A gendered analysis constitutes much more than this.
Critical IPE will not fulfil its own stated aims until it gains a more sophisticated
understanding of what a gendered approach means and then utilises it routinely in its
analyses.
For a more concrete examination of the causes, consequences and solutions to this
problem, we now turn to the analysis of globalisation. As one of the predominant
themes in the critical IPE research and publishing agenda in recent years, analyses of
globalisation that incorporate gender as an analytical category should be central to
a critical IPE. Furthermore it has been claimed that globalisation has increased the
need to go beyond established IPE orthodoxies to develop a new more heterodox
IPE.24 However the majority of critical writings on globalisation also share the causes
and consequences of the gender-blindness outlined above. Globalisation therefore
provides an ideal example with which to illustrate the more abstract arguments about
the form that a gendered IPE, that goes beyond ‘simply adding women in’, could take
within a reformulated critical IPE. Some of the necessary work has already been
done, as globalisation is also now a key theme in a heterogeneous body of feminist
scholarship. This article will explore the diverse writings on globalisation emerging
from two influential feminist perspectives: feminist economics/gendered political
economy and feminist IR. It will demonstrate that both have a key role to play in
gendering IPE. Engagement with these analyses within critical IPE would help it to
acknowledge the ways in which gender is fundamentally constitutive of processes of
globalisation.
The study of globalisation
Over the last decade, a great deal of research in a range of disciplines has focused on
understanding, defining and theorising globalisation. IPE, and within that critical
IPE in particular, has been no exception to this pattern. But within the large and
diverse body of work on globalisation there is little consensus. The term has been
used in numerous diﬀerent ways with diﬀerent meanings and there is often
unacknowledged slippage between them that adds to the overall confusion. In some
contexts, globalisation is conceptualised as a process, in others as an outcome. Some
initially argued that globalisation is a new process that had proceeded apace since the
1970s (the hyper-globalisers) while others claimed that nothing we have witnessed is
really new or qualitatively diﬀerent (the sceptics) as internationalisation has long
23 Robert O’Brien, ‘The Agency of Labour in a Changing Global Order’, in Richard Stubbs and
Geoﬀrey Underhill (eds.), Political Economy and the Changing Global Order, 2nd edn. (Ontario:
Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 38–47.
24 Amin et al., ‘Forum for Heterodox IPE’.
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been a feature of capitalism.25 Analysts also divide into those who take a narrow,
predominantly economic definition of globalisation and those who want a wider
definition, often more focused on culture.26 Indeed this division has sometimes been
rather crudely characterised as a dichotomy between social science and humanities
approaches to globalisation with all the attendant diﬀerences in methodology and
epistemology that result. Analysts also diﬀer over the extent that they are for or
against the processes associated with globalisation. Some use globalisation simply as
a description, but for others – particularly those who are in favour of it – it is often
an explanation, even a rationale and something inevitable, irresistible and beneficial.
Not unsurprisingly IPE analyses of globalisation have tended to concentrate on
the economic processes identified with it, although of late growing attention has been
paid to the associated political processes. Numerous studies have looked at the
restructuring of production, trade, finance, and migration, through changes in the
global movement of goods, capital and people as well as the impact of technological
innovation particularly information and communications technology (ICT). In
addition, attention has focused on changing structures of international governance,
examining the role of actors at the international, regional and national levels as well
as non-state actors such as TNCs and global civil society. The relative power of
international institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and WTO, TNCs and the
nation state has been hotly debated.
Critical IPE has made significant contributions to many of these debates. In
keeping with its commitment to pluralism, ‘narrow circumscribing views of globali-
sation are rejected’ and diﬀerent analytical traditions (more broadly defined than
politics and economics) are brought together that problematise social relations,
discourse and practice and place globalisation in its broad historical and intellectual
context.27 Scholars identified with a critical IPE perspective are predominantly
anti-globalisation, arguing that it brings increasing inequality and polarisation.
Indeed globalisation is frequently associated with the spread of neoliberal ideology
and the implementation of neoliberal policies, epitomised for example by the
structural adjustment programmes advocated by the World Bank and IMF).28
Critical IPE has also highlighted the negative impact of globalisation on democracy
and accountability citing the increased power of actors such as TNCs and financial
institutions such as international banks in combination with the reduced power of
nation states as their sovereignty is undermined.29 The challenges and resistances to
globalisation have also been explored most thoroughly by those identified with this
perspective.30
Yet one characteristic which all these diﬀering perspectives, including the majority
of critical IPE analyses, share is gender blindness, with little acknowledgement within
25 Paul Hirst, Paul and Graham Thompson, Globalization in Question (Cambridge: Polity, 1996).
26 Marchand and Runyan, Gender and Global Restructuring.
27 Introduction to Randall Germain (ed.), Globalization and Its Critics: Perspectives from Political
Economy (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), pp. xiii–xx.
28 S. Gill, ‘Globalisation, market civilisation and disciplinary neo-liberalism’, Millenium, 24:3 (1995),
pp. 399–423.
29 Gill, Globalisation.
30 Barry Gills (ed.), Globalization and the Politics of Resistance (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000); Robert
O’Brien, Anne Marie Goetz, Jan Arte Scholte, and Mark Williams, Contesting Global Governance:
Multilateral Economic Insitutions and Global Social Movements (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2000).
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this macro-level picture of globalisation that gender is a constitutive force in either
the processes of globalisation or their consequences. The few analyses that go so far
as to mention women, do it in one of two ways that constitute attempting to ‘add
women in’. First, a few analyses make some reference to the impact of processes of
globalisation on women – predominantly seen as a homogeneous category and
frequently as passive victims of the processes of globalisation. Secondly, when
women are considered as agents it is in one particular, narrowly defined, context: the
roles played by women’s movements and feminism. Therefore a few critical analyses
do acknowledge that women’s movements and women’s activism have played a part
in constituting the emerging ‘global civil society’ when it is deemed to exist, but even
this is not commonplace.31
As a result, women’s agency, if recognised, is predominantly seen as important in
resisting globalisation. Therefore even those critical analysts who think that they are
using gender as an analytical category, are actually only talking about the role of
women actors in this one context. What is more, this very restricted usage allows
them to argue mistakenly that gender analysis is primarily counter-hegemonic.32
Although highlighting the roles played by diﬀerent women is important, it is not
enough. The larger point is that few, if any, studies take on the much more diﬃcult
task of examining how the processes and structures associated with globalisation are
gendered. Gender is rarely incorporated into any of the analytical frameworks used
by IPE scholars to analyse globalisation.
These claims can be illustrated fairly easily. It is not possible to examine all of the
now large literature on globalisation here. However, a more systematic analysis of a
number of the influential edited collections whose titles would indicate that they
might consider gender as an important theme confirms these trends. They were
selected on the following criteria. First, the chapter authors and/or editors are
identified with critical IPE; second, these volumes figure prominently on student
reading lists and in library collections; and third, they are widely cited by other
scholars in the field. The Political Economy of Globalization, for example, has only
four mentions of women and they are all in the chapter on global civil society by Jan
Arte Scholte.33 In Globalization: Critical Reﬂections, despite the largest of the three
substantive sections of the book being entitled ‘The counter-thrust to globalization:
political and cultural resistance’, there is only one article that mentions women.34
Globalization and Its Critics: Perspectives from Political Economy does not include
any mention of gender (except a couple of cursory references in an article on
philosophy in which the author says, for example, that lecturers may treat male and
female students diﬀerently and that no women are generally listed among great IR
thinkers), and the volume as a whole does not cite any feminist critiques of
globalisation.35 Globalization and Politics of Resistance has no chapter on women, no
reference to gender and only four references to women in the index.36
31 John Mittelman (ed.), Globalization: Critical Reﬂections (Boulder, CO: Lynn Rienner, 1997); Gills,
Globalization and Resistance; Ngaire Woods (ed.), The Political Economy of Globalization
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000).
32 B. Gills, ‘Re-orientating the New (International) Political Economy’, New Political Economy, 6:2
(2001).
33 J. A. Scholte, ‘Global Civil Society’, in Ngaire Woods, Political Economy’.
34 Mittelman, Globalization: Critical Reﬂection.
35 Germain, Globalization and its Critics.
36 Gills, Globalization and Resistance.
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The content of two important texts on the globalisation reinforces these findings.
The first, Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture is fairly typical of
the genre (it explicitly lists culture as one of its concerns thereby signalling that it is
taking a wider sweep than simply politics and economics).37 Yet, gender as an
analytical category is entirely absent from the volume both in the analytical
framework, and from the more empirically based discussions, such as migration.
Gender is also absent from the index – although this did include a reference to the
Spice Girls – and from the bibliography – the authors’ reading appears not to have
been informed by any of the debates relevant to the gendered analysis of globalisa-
tion. There are two mentions of women’s movements: the first in the chapter on the
impact of cultural globalisation (p. 371) as an example of a new social movement in
the West that is a transnational or ‘third cultural network’, and again as contesting
globalisation in the conclusion (p. 452). There is also one mention of women’s rights
(CEDAW) in a section on the human rights regime (p. 67). The companion reader to
that volume, Global Transformations: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate,
displays many of the same characteristics. Gender is absent from the analytical
framework laid out by the editors in the introductory chapter.38 However, included
in its 480 pages are eight pages on ‘the gender dimension’ by Jill Steans; some of the
other contributors recognise gender as a category – for example in labour costs or
internet use (see the contributions by Fred Halliday, UNDP report, Manuel Castells,
Chris Brown) – and others recognise the importance of feminism as a social
movement (Chris Brown, Michael Mann).39
As a consequence, many of the categories used in this literature are not
deconstructed and the complexity of the processes involved in globalisation is missed.
Even when considering globalisation from the perspective of people rather than
abstract processes (which by the admission of many critical writers on globalisation
should be done more frequently) again they are often seen as gender-free individuals.
For example studies of migration often fail to analyse who migrants are in gender
terms, ignoring the diﬀerent reasons for male and female migration, diﬀerent levels
of skill and the diﬀerent sorts of employment men and women take on, whether for
example it is in the informal sector such as domestic service or the provision of sexual
services.40 In discussions of actors’ resistance to globalisation, after the passing
reference to women’s resistance, all other actors continue to be seen as gender-free
individuals with little sense, for example, that men and women have diﬀerent interests
and identities. As a partial exception to this pattern, O’Brien does recognise that, as
a result of the changes brought about by globalisation, women now form a large
proportion of unprotected workers and that partly as a consequence of women’s
activism in new social movements, trade unions now feel compelled to take on new
issues in their campaigns because they need to form broader coalitions and to recruit
women members.41
37 David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton, Global Transformations:
Politics, Economics and Culture (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999).
38 David Held and Anthony McGrew (eds.), Global Transformations: An Introduction to the
Globalization Debate (Cambridge: Polity, 2000).
39 One notable exception to this gender blindness is the collection edited by Eleonore Kofman and
Gillian Youngs, Globalization: Theory and Practice (London: Pinter, 1996), but this is not surprising
as both the editors are feminists who undertake gendered analyses.
40 Held and McGrew, Global Transformations.
41 O’Brien, ‘Agency’.
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The analyses of the processes associated with globalisation are even more devoid
of gender as a category. For example, both mainstream and critical IPE analyses of
trade liberalisation and the restructuring of production rarely acknowledge the extent
to which these processes are highly gendered – such as the ways in which women’s
labour has been central to much export production both in the industrial and
agricultural sectors. Also ignored are the ways in which changes in the organisation
of global finance structures, and the impact of the financial instability that has
resulted from the deregulation of capital movements, impact diﬀerently on men and
women. Those examining the eﬀects of policies associated with neoliberal ideology,
such as structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) and welfare restructuring, often
fail to acknowledge that, despite their overt gender neutrality, SAPs have a very
diﬀerent impact on men and women. Indeed, studies of the polarisation and
inequalities that accompany globalisation rarely examine the full extent to which
these inequalities are racialised and sexualised.
Why has this been the case? Despite the stated commitment of many critical
scholars to methodological pluralism, to the analysis of markets and states as socially
constructed institutions and to a move away from a focus on structures, that together
would make their frameworks more open to gender, they do not often use concepts
that would allow their analyses of globalisation to incorporate gender. As we have
seen, any consideration of the significance of the unpaid economy and the costs of
social reproduction is rarely included in their analyses. They focus almost entirely on
the formal/public sphere without looking at the household and the private sphere and
the connections between the productive and reproductive economies. The importance
of the nature of the sexual division of labour, for example in the production decisions
of TNCs, is rarely acknowledged. In addition the starting points of critical scholars
(in common with mainstream ones) and feminist scholars can be very diﬀerent. For
example feminist critiques often begin at the micro-level while IPE is primarily
focused on the macro-level.42 The language and discourse used by both are often
dissimilar. As a consequence of these factors, the trends and processes involved in
globalisation are still talked about even in the majority of the critical IPE literature
in top-down and abstract terms. They are therefore conceptualised in such a way that
makes many of the dominant discourses of IPE and globalisation diﬃcult to
penetrate, either to simply ‘add women in’ or more ambitiously to attempt to
reformulate IPE as a discipline.43 Therefore despite the claims of the critical scholars
that their approach is diﬀerent, they, too, have not got away from the perspectives
that they see as characterising other types of IPE.
Overall there are few examples of analyses of globalisation that do incorporate
gender in any meaningful way. The work of Saskia Sassen provides an exception,
going beyond simply ‘adding women in’. Many of her analyses focus primarily on
one aspect of globalisation, the nature of the global city and the ways in which the
changes associated with globalisation have contributed to the emergence of global
cities. As well as examining abstract processes such as changes to production, the
state and sovereignty involved in globalisation in gendered terms, Sassen starts from
the perspective of people, seeing them not as abstract individuals but as workers and
42 O’Brien et al., Contesting Global Governance.
43 Isabella Bakker, ‘Who built the Pyramids? Engendering the new international economic and
financial architecture’, ISA paper, Chicago 2001.
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migrants fundamentally aﬀected by their gender, class and racial identities. Sassen
can provide gendered analyses: firstly because her analytical framework is open to
utilising the necessary concepts, but also because she uses the gendered analyses that
have already been undertaken by feminist scholars. It is to this body of work that we
now turn, since critical IPE will have to engage with this literature in order to produce
gendered analyses that come closer to reflecting the complexity of the processes
involved in globalisation.44
Towards a gendered IPE of globalisation
Much of the work needed to create a gendered IPE has already been undertaken.
There is now a large body of literature that describes the impact of globalisation on
women and the role played by women actors in resisting globalisation, as well as
some work that uses gender as an analytical category to analyse the processes of
globalisation. Crudely it can be divided into that which emanates from gendered
political economy perspective (and within that feminist economics), as it has been
defined above and that which emanates from feminist IR. This distinction oversim-
plifies and over-polarises what are often heterogeneous and overlapping categories,
but it is a useful device with which to set up the terms of the discussion. Although
gendered political economy and feminist IR share a commitment to feminism,
pluralism and interdisciplinary scholarship, there are diﬀerences between them in
terms of their intellectual origins and the methodologies and epistemologies that they
use. Both perspectives are still, perhaps inevitably, tied into their intellectual and
disciplinary origins and the battles they have fought or are still fighting within those
disciplines. These factors influence the kinds of analyses that have been produced and
where they have been developed. The gender and feminist theory section of ISA has
been very influential in the emergence of feminist IR and in recent years, IAFFE and
its journal Feminist Economics has played an important role in the development of a
gendered political economy. Before elaborating the kinds of work that have already
been done, it is useful to outline the major characteristics of these two approaches to
see how they can come together to produce gendered analyses of globalisation.
Gendered political economy/feminist economics approaches to globalisation
In comparison to feminist IR, until quite recently there has been a less clearly
identifiable body of work within gendered political economy/feminist economics
focusing directly or explicitly on globalisation. But the term is now being used more
frequently. This is not to say that a large amount of research relevant to the analysis
of gender and globalisation has not already been published.45 As feminist economics
44 See, for example, Saskia Sassen, Globalization and its Discontents (New York: The New Publisher,
1998).
45 Feminist economists have shown some reluctance to use the term globalisation. The Special Issue of
Feminist Economics on ‘Gender and Globalization’, 6:3 (2000) is the first major academic feminist
economics publication to engage with the term globalisation, and, although covering much of the
same ground, the World Development Special Issue on ‘Growth, Trade Finance and Gender
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tends to use a narrower definition of globalisation than feminist IR, globalisation has
been seen as a predominantly economic phenomenon. Much of the work carried out
to date has focused on economic restructuring, is still mainly about the ‘third world’
and can be identified with a ‘development agenda’. However, it has now been
recognised that more consideration should be given to the relationship between
globalisation and ‘first world’ women, examining, for example, the relationship
between trade liberalisation and women’s employment in both the first and third
worlds.46
It is possible to trace the intellectual origins of much of the gendered political
economy/feminist economics work on globalisation, in terms of subject matter,
underlying approach and personnel, back to the Gender and Development (GAD)
work that emerged in the late 1970s and 1980s.47 GAD grew out of the socialist
feminist ideas of the 1970s. It developed through critiques of mainstream liberal
development theory and its feminist oﬀshoot ‘Women in Development’ (WID), as
well as underdevelopment theory (highlighting its gender-blindness). GAD always
placed great emphasis on analysing the wider global processes of accumulation
involved in the spread of capitalist social relations.48 We can argue that part of what
we are currently seeing is a reformulation of those longstanding concerns of GAD
scholars and the incorporation of their work into the gender and globalisation
literature from a gendered political economy/feminist economics perspective. This
has been reinforced by the insistence of many feminist economists that gender issues
must be integrated into macroeconomics. Therefore what used to be described as
GAD work is now seen as part of feminist economics and the gender and
globalisation literature.
It is partly because of the intellectual origins of much of the feminist economists’
work on globalisation, that it does give more emphasis to structures and the
‘material’ than much of the feminist IR. It is also more quantitative and empiricist
than feminist IR. Even though it is seen as very ‘unscientific’ within economics, its
methodologies are often closer to mainstream social science than feminist IR, and
debates within feminist economics about the range of appropriate methods and
approaches have some links to debates within economics about the nature of the
discipline. In contrast to feminist IR, many feminist economists working in this area
have not tended to utilise with the gender and globalisation work undertaken by
feminist IR scholars. Feminist economists are also interested in policy outcomes, in
intervening into policy debates and aﬀecting policymaking processes. They there-
fore interact both with the governments of nation-states and international
institutions such as the UN as advisers and paid personnel. As a result the work of
Inequality’ (2000), edited by some prominent feminist economists, does not use the term until the
last page of the Introduction. However, globalisation is prominent in the UNDAW 1999 World
Survey on the Role of Women in Development: Globalization, Gender and Work (New York:
UNDAW, 1999), which itself is very influenced by the work of feminist economists.
46 Although the editorial of the Feminist Economics Special Issue on globalisation talks about this, the
articles are on flexible labour in Mexico, the Asian financial crisis, India’s new economic policy of
1991 and export growth in Taiwan.
47 Ester Boserup’s book, Women’s Role in Economic Development (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1970)
is a pioneering work in this field.
48 Kate Young, Carol Wolkowitz and Roisin McCullagh (eds.), Of Marriage and the Market: Women’s
Subordination in International Perspective (London: CSE Books, 1981); D. Elson and R. Pearson,
‘Nimble Fingers Make Cheap Workers: An Analysis of Women’s Employment in Third World
Export Manufacturing’, Feminist Review, 7 (Spring 1981), pp. 87–107.
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feminist economists has had some impact on policy debates, for example with gender
mainstreaming, gender budgets and eﬀorts to gender macroeconomic policy.
Feminist IR approaches to globalisation
The feminist IR literature on globalisation has grown out of the now quite large field
of feminist IR and as such has played a role in the debates within IR about
epistemology and approach. Although part of social science, IR has been very
influenced by many of the humanities debates about postmodernism, language and
identity, and feminist IR has often been positioned as post-positivist within the
‘paradigm’ debate in IR. In the past much of the feminist IR writing on IPE has said
more about IR than IPE and, although this tendency has diminished, it has not quite
disappeared.49 Feminist IR tends to use a much broader definition of globalisation
than feminist economics. It is critical of the gender blindness and economism of the
majority of the mainstream literature that sees globalisation as a predominantly
economic process that states and people are powerless to resist, arguing that it is
necessary to look at cultural and ideational aspects as well.50 Indeed using Hooper’s
work on hegemonic masculinity, Marianne Marchand argues that utilising this
concept can help to illuminate the connections between ‘gendered representations of
globalisation and its dynamics of power’ as part of an approach that gives greater
prominence to cultural and ideational factors.51
But the feminist IR literature on globalisation is also quite heterogeneous,
probably more so than the gendered political economy/feminist economics one.
Locher and Prugl identify two positions on power within feminist IR that in some
ways mirror diﬀerent feminist IR positions on globalisation.52 The first sees gender
constructions as part of a larger system of subordination (such as capitalism or
patriarchy), and within this framework power is seen as an ideology (echoing
Marchand’s arguments about hegemonic masculinity).53 This approach has more in
common with structuralist approaches and as such with feminist economics. The
second sees power as located within the formation of identities and subjectivity and
49 Much early feminist IR work consisted of programmatic statements laying out what should be done
to gender IPE without actually doing it: see Christine Sylvester, ‘The Emperor’s Theories and
Transformations: Looking at the Field Through Feminist Lenses’, in David Pirages and Christine
Sylvester (eds.), Transformations in Global Political Economy (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990); J. Ann
Tickner, ‘On the Fringes of the World Economy: A Feminist Perspective’, in Murphy and Tooze
(eds.), The New International Political Economy; Sandra Whitworth, ‘Theory as Exclusion: Gender
and International Political Economy’, in Richard Stubbs and Geoﬀrey Underhill (eds.), Political
Economy and the Changing Global Order (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994). Then followed a phase in
which gender and IR texts began to include a rather brief chapter on IPE (for example, Jill Steans,
Gender and International Relations: An Introduction (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998). Many of these
chapters are not about IPE. Even Sandra Whitworth’s updated chapter ‘Theory and Exclusion:
Gender, Masculinity and International Political Economy’ in the second edition of Stubbs and
Underhill’s Political Economy, published in 2001, is still primarily about feminist IR.
50 Marchand and Runyan, Gender and Global Restructuring.
51 Marianne Marchand, ‘Gendered Representations of the ‘‘Global’’: Reading/Writing Globalization’,
in Stubbs and Underhill, Political Economy, 2nd edn., p. 221; Charlotte Hooper, ‘Masculinities in
Transition: The Case of Globalization’, in Marchand and Runyan, Gender and Global Restructuring.
52 Locher and Prugl, ‘Feminism and Constructivism’.
53 Gillian Youngs, ‘Breaking Patriarchal Bonds: Demythologizing the Public/Private’, in Marchand
and Runyan, Gender and Global Restructuring.
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is perhaps less compatible with feminist economics.54 In comparison to feminist
economics, approaches to globalisation, feminist IR (particularly the second variant)
puts more emphasis on identity and subjectivity and therefore on human agency, but
agency rather narrowly defined as counterposed to structure rather than interacting
with it. As a result feminist IR has been less concerned to address the economic issues
that are often associated with structural and ‘material’ conditions and that are central
to feminist economics.
This focus on the agency of women activists, frequently seen in terms of their
resistance to globalisation, also coincides with a relative lack of interest within this
perspective in influencing the policy agendas of states and international institutions.
Indeed, working with states and international institutions is sometimes seen as
colluding with globalisation. But despite their diﬀerent approach, the feminist IR
scholars have used a lot of feminist economics work in their own analyses, for
example in discussions of the ways in which diﬀerent forms of women’s labour have
been central to globalisation. However, they have also been critical of gendered
political economy/feminist economics work as variously over-emphasising structures,
being too quantitative in methodological terms, too ready to deal with the state and
too top-down in its focus.55
A gendered analysis of globalisation56
Both within feminist IR and gendered political economy/feminist economics, scholars
are agreed that it is not enough to simply ‘add women’ in to critical IPE analyses of
globalisation. One solution advocated by Marchand and Runyan is to go beyond
what they see as the narrow materialist understandings of critical IPE and address the
ideational and cultural aspects as well.57 As we will see below, they believe that
feminist IR is in an ideal position to bridge the gap between the materialist and
ideational to produce a more inclusive analysis of globalisation (or global restruc-
turing as they prefer to call it). However, although necessary, the addition of cultural
and material factors into the analysis is not enough. It is also imperative to gender the
analysis of the ‘material’ and fully demonstrate that gender is fundamentally
constitutive of processes of globalisation. Gendered political economy/feminist
economics has an important contribution to make to these tasks. It is now possible
54 In an important recent book Spike Peterson has outlined what a gendered global political economy
would look like from their perspective. See V. Spike Peterson, A Critical Rewriting of Global
Political Economy: Integrating Reproductive, Productive and Virtual Economies (New York:
Routledge, 2003).
55 Susan Bergeron, ‘Political Economy Discourses of Globalization and Feminist Politics’, Signs, 26:4
(2001), pp. 983–1006. Some scholars have tried to bring together the diﬀerent strands of the gender
and globalisation work. But often this privileges feminist IR approaches that emphasise culture,
identity and power at the expense of gendered political economy/feminist economics approaches
which are characterised as displaying ‘mono-disciplinary, productivist and masculinist biases that
generate ‘‘thin’’ and ideologically constrained analyses’: V. S. Peterson, ‘Rewriting (Global) Political
Economy as Reproductive, Productive and Virtual (Foucauldian) Economies’, International Feminist
Journal of Politics, 4:1 (2002), pp. 1–30; Peterson, Critical Rewriting.
56 For a more detailed discussion see Georgina Waylen, ‘Putting Governance into the Gendered
Political Economy of Globalization’, International Journal of Feminist Politics, 6:4 (2004).
57 Marchand and Runyan, Gender and Global Restructuring.
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to outline the gendered analyses of globalisation that encompass insights from both
gendered political economy/feminist economics and feminist IR.
The work that has been produced so far can be divided into four interrelated
layers. None of these on their own is enough to produce a gendered analysis of
globalisation. The first examines the ideologies, discourses and narratives of globalis-
ation and emanates primarily from a feminist IR perspective. The second and third
categories cover the impact of the processes of globalisation on women and the roles
played by some women in response to globalisation, filling in the gaps left in the
majority of mainstream and critical scholarship which has focused primarily on men.
This work comes from both feminist IR and gendered political economy/feminist
economics scholars. The minimal consideration of women already undertaken by a
few critical IPE scholars also fits into these categories. The final layer, work that
shows how gender is constitutive of processes of globalisation, derives from all the
other categories but also results from the deployment of concepts and analytical
frameworks used by gendered political economy/feminist economics. Although the
first three layers provide the essential building blocks for a gendered analysis of
globalisation that incorporates both the ideational and the material, without the kind
of overarching framework provided by the fourth layer, it cannot be complete.
Discourses, narratives and ideologies of globalisation
When considering cultural and ideational aspects, feminist IR writings have empha-
sised the necessity of deconstructing the narratives, discourses and ideologies
surrounding globalisation (the so-called ‘myths of globalisation’) to demonstrate the
ways in which, although apparently neutral, they are highly gendered whether they
come from the left or the right.58 Based on Robert O’Connell’s notion of hegemonic
masculinity, Hooper argues that discourses of Anglo-American hegemonic mascu-
linity that underlie gendered power struggles are undergoing change as part of
globalisation and that these changes need to be analysed and understood.59 She
illustrates her arguments with an analysis of The Economist as a magazine that is read
by business elites supportive of globalisation and that is helping to construct the new
dominant symbolic imagery of the globalised political economy. Although not
without its contradictions and disruptions, she argues that The Economist puts
forward images of an aggressive ‘frontier’ masculinity of risk-taking entrepreneuri-
alism that is associated with the activities of the new global executive and the new
technocracy. Within many of these narratives on both the right and the left,
globalisation is seen as an irresistible masculine force. Indeed Freeman has argued
that there is a tendency for masculinist theories of globalisation to examine
macro-global processes, ignoring gender as an analytical lens, while local empirical
studies put gender at centre stage and as a result the local becomes seen as somehow
feminine and fundamentally defined by the global.60
58 Ibid., p. 12.
59 Hooper, ‘Masculinities’.
60 C. Freeman, ‘Is Local: Global as Feminine: Masculine? Rethinking the Gender of Globalization’,
Signs, 26:4 (2001), pp. 1007–39, p. 1013.
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The impact of processes of globalisation
Much of the work on gender and globalisation examines the second layer: the
diﬀerential impact of processes of globalisation on both men and women and on
diﬀerent groups of women. It therefore aims to improve our knowledge and analysis
of the role of women in these processes. It moves beyond the consideration of women
as a homogeneous group and a crude tendency to see women as victims of
globalisation, enabling analyses to appreciate the complex and contradictory out-
comes that globalisation has produced. The bulk of this research has been under-
taken by feminist economists and addresses themes pertinent to critical IPE. It has
focused primarily on changes in women’s labour in the workplace and the household
that have resulted from the changing patterns of trade and production, with some
attention also paid to the impact of policies associated with globalisation such as
SAPs and welfare restructuring.
Overall the changes accompanying globalisation such as increased trade liberali-
sation, flexibilisation of employment, the growth of the service sector, explicit and
implicit deregulation and the relocation of manufacturing from the first world have
resulted in an overall increase in women’s participation in the paid labour force and
a decline in men’s participation in most of the world, leading some to argue that we
were witnessing a global feminisation of labour.61 However, studies have shown that
these overall trends must be deconstructed as diﬀerent groups of women are
participating in very diﬀerent ways and these processes are not taking place evenly or
straightforwardly. Overturning the old consensus that industrialisation marginalised
women, Elson and Pearson argued that much of the new export-led manufacturing
(often owned by TNCs in Export Processing Zones (EPZs)) established in parts of the
third world actually depended on female labour, often provided by young single
women.62 However, later analyses demonstrate the complexity of the situation: for
example, studies from Mexico show that employers sometimes favour married
women and that the numbers of women in the maquiladora workforce can also fall in
the face of changing conditions.63 Studies of the role of women’s labour in the
development of non-traditional agricultural exports such as flowers, fruit and luxury
vegetables like mange-touts have also shown its centrality in this sector but often in
low-paid temporary work.64 Women’s employment has also increased in service
sector occupations such as retailing and financial services. Employment prospects
have improved particularly for highly educated middle-class women who have
entered well-paid jobs in the service sector and the professions. In contrast, poorer
women are frequently forced to take insecure badly-paid, low-skilled jobs in the
service sector, often providing the domestic services within the household that enable
the professional women to participate in the labour market. In the first world, many
of these positions are taken by (often deskilled) migrant women, who often end up in
61 G. Standing, ‘Global Feminization Through Flexible Labour’, World Development, 17:7 (1989),
pp. 1077–95.
62 Elson and Pearson ‘Nimble Fingers’.
63 Ruth Pearson, ‘Nimble Fingers Revisited: Reflections on Women and Third World Industrialization
in the Late Twentieth Century’, in Cecile Jackson and Ruth Pearson (eds.), Feminist Visions of
Development: Gender Analysis and Policy (London: Routledge, 1998).
64 Stephanie Barrientos, Anna Bee, Ann Matear and Isobel Vogel, Women in Agribusiness: Working
Miracles in the Chilean Fruit Export Sector (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999).
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the most precarious and insecure employment such as in subcontracted garment
manufacturing workshops.65
A number of studies have also looked at the impact of the neoliberal economic
reform that has accompanied the restructuring that forms part of processes of
globalisation.66 Short-term adjustment policies, such as SAPs for example, have
particular, often contradictory, implications for diﬀerent groups of women. Cuts in
welfare services have an impact on women as providers and consumers of health and
social services resulting in a loss of employment for some women and the expenditure
of more time and eﬀort to replace lost provision by, often poor, women in their roles
within the household. At the same time they may have to adopt survival strategies
in order to ‘make ends meet’ as well as undertake additional income-generating
activities. At the same time, as we have seen, employment opportunities in some
sectors of the restructured economy have increased. The longer-term restructuring of
the state and economies also has diﬀerential impact on men and women. Social sector
reform often entails a move from ostensibly ‘gender neutral’ to ‘gender diﬀerentiated’
schemes. The move towards marketised schemes for pensions and health care result
in only better oﬀ women having coverage and then on less favourable terms than men
earning the same salaries.67 The complex and often contradictory nature of these
gendered processes of globalisation have therefore been highlighted.
Women’s organising
The third layer moves away from the impact of processes of globalisation on diﬀerent
women and focuses on women’s agency in the form of women’s collective organising.
Although the research on women’s organising on local, regional and international
levels has been undertaken by a variety of feminist scholars, there has been a
tendency for some (sometimes from a feminist IR perspective) to interpret a broad
spectrum of activities in blanket terms as women’s resistance to globalisation.68 A
more sophisticated analysis that diﬀerentiates between the variety of activities
undertaken by diﬀerent women is necessary. At the local level, in addition to the
studies of diﬀerent feminist movements, there are a number of analyses of women’s
economic organising in the workplace – such as the factory – showing the ways in
65 Patricia Fernandez Kelly and Saskia Sassen, ‘Recasting Women in the Global Economy:
Internationalization and Changing Definitions of Gender’, in Christine Bose and Ellen Acosta-Belen
(eds.), Women in the Latin American Development Process (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University
Press, 1995); Eleonore Kofman, ‘Beyond a Reductionist Analysis of Female Migrants in Global
European Cities: The Unskilled, Deskilled, and Professional’, in Marchand and Runyan, Gender and
Global Restructuring.
66 Haleh Afshar and Carolynne Dennis (eds.), Women and Adjustment Policies in the Third World
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992); Isabella Bakker, ‘Introduction: Engendering Macro-economic
Policy Reform in the Era of Global Restructuring and Adjustment’, in Isabella Bakker (ed.), The
Strategic Silence: Gender and Economic Policy (London: Zed Books, 1994), pp. 1–9; Pamela Sparr
(ed.), Mortgaging Women’s Lives: Feminist Critiques of Structural Adjustment (London: Zed Books,
1994).
67 A. Arenas de Montecinos and V. Montecinos, ‘The Privatization of Social Security and Women’s
Welfare: Gender Eﬀects of the Chilean Reform’, Latin American Research Review, 34:3 (1999),
pp. 7–38.
68 Sheila Rowbotham and Stephanie Linkogle Rowbotham, Women Resist Globalization: Mobilizing
for Livelihood and Rights (London: Zed Books, 2001).
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which women can resist employers’ demands, helping to dispel myths about the
passivity of women workers in the face of economic restructuring more generally.69
These are complemented by studies of poor women’s organising at the community
level in the face of the economic hardship often resulting from SAPs.70 For example,
studies of collective survival strategies in poor neighbourhoods in Chile and Peru
have looked at communal kitchens and the provision of food and milk for young
children, together with income-generating activities such as bakeries and other
artisanal workshops.71
Few analyses have been focused on the regional level until recently. But more
attention is now being paid to some of the organising that has accompanied the ‘new
regionalism’ of the 1990s and development of regional women’s organisations.
Regional trading blocs such as NAFTA and longer standing regional integration
projects such as the EU have gained some attention. A number of feminist IR
scholars have looked at the cross-border organising between women in Canada,
USA and Mexico round issues of workers rights across borders in the context of
the regional trade agreement.72 Latin America has seen, for example, women’s
organisations from a number of diﬀerent countries joining together around issues
such as human rights, domestic violence and reproductive rights to form regional
networks on these subjects. This process has been facilitated by developments at the
international level.
Women’s organising has increasingly been taking place at the international level.
Facilitated by the development of new technologies such as ICT, scholars have
pointed to the development of transnational advocacy networks of professionalised
and ‘NGOised’ women’s organisations that are often avowedly feminist and attempt
to reframe issues for elites at the international level.73 Specialised groups such as
Women’s Eyes on the Bank (many of whom were feminist economists) have also
lobbied international organisations such as the World Bank.74 A number of the UN
conferences, such as the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, the 1993 Vienna Conference on
Human Rights and the 1994 Cairo Population Conference as well as the 1995 Beijing
69 Aiwa Ong, Spirits of Resistance and Capitalist Discipline: Factory Women in Malaysia (Buﬀalo, NY:
State University of New York, 1987); Linda Lim, ‘Women’s Work in Export Factories: the Politics
of a Cause’, in Irene Tinker (ed.), Persistent Inequalities: Women and World Development (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1990); Sheila Rowbotham and Swasti Mitter (eds.), Dignity and Daily
Bread: New Forms of Economic Organizing among Poor Women in the Third World and the First
(London: Routledge, 1994); Amrita Basu (ed.), The Challenge of Local Feminisms: Women’s
Movements in Global Perspective (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995).
70 Amy Lind, ‘Negotiating Boundaries: Women’s Organizations and the Politics of Restructuring in
Ecuador’, in Marchand and Runyan, Gender and Global Restructuring.
71 Maruja Barrig, ‘Women, Collective Kitchens and the Crisis of the State in Peru’, in John Friedman,
Rachel Abers and Lisa Autler (eds.), Emergences: Women’s Struggles for Lifelihood in Latin America
(Los Angeles: Center for Latin American Studies, UCLA, 1996).
72 Laura Macdonald, ‘Globalization and Social Movements: Comparing Women’s Movement
Responses to NAFTA in Mexico, the USA and Canada’, International Feminist Journal of Politics,
4:2 (2002), pp. 151–72; Ann Sisson Runyan, ‘The Places of Women in Trading Places: Gendered
Global/Regional Regimes and Internationalised Feminist Resistance’, in Kofman and Youngs,
Globalization: Theory and Practice.
73 Margaret Keck and Katherine Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in
International Politics (Cornell, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); Sonia Alvarez, ‘Latin American
Feminisms ‘‘Go Global’’: Trends for the 1990s and Challenges for the New Millenium’, in Sonia
Alvarez, Arturo Escobar, and Evelino Dagnino (eds.), Politics of Culture/Cultures of Politics
(Boulder, CO: Westview, 1998).
74 O’Brien et al., Contesting Global Governance.
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Women’s conference, have also acted as an important spur to the development of
transnational organising. After preparatory organising at the national and regional
level, diﬀerent groups have come together in women’s caucuses and the NGO forum
at the Beijing conference to press for change.75 International organising therefore has
also fed back down to activities at the regional and local level.76 But women’s
organising, although important, can only be seen as one aspect of a gendered analysis
of globalisation.
Framework and concepts
This wealth of research discussed above provides some of the essential constituents of
a gendered analysis of globalisation. The majority of it goes beyond simply ‘adding
women in’ as either ‘victims’ or ‘resisters’ of globalisation as they have often been
portrayed in critical IPE. It has demonstrated the variety of women’s organising at
diﬀerent levels and the complexity of the impact of processes of globalisation on
diﬀerent groups of women, showing for example that changes in employment
opportunities have not aﬀected all women in the same ways. However, although it
supplies valuable data and analysis, it does not amount to a gendered analysis of
globalisation on its own. For example, many studies have tended to separate the
analysis of women’s agency (often in the form of women’s organising) and the role
of processes and institutions (in the category of the impact of globalisation on
diﬀerent women) without considering how the two impact upon each other. The
more challenging task is to develop a more overarching analysis that can bring these
separate categories together and examine the interaction of actors, both men and
women, with structures that are understood as fundamentally gendered. In order to
have analyses that show how gender is constitutive of processes of globalisation, our
previous discussion has demonstrated that several things are necessary.
First, rather than seeing the global and the local as separate categories, with one
identified as masculine and the other as feminine, their analysis must be brought
together. Freeman argues that that there should be a feminist reconceptualisation of
the global in which local forms of global are not just seen as eﬀects but as constitutive
ingredients of the global, thereby decoupling the link that has fused gender with the
local.77 She uses the example of Jamaican higglers (women traders), arguing that they
should be seen as agents of globalisation, involved not only in responding to the
demands of global capitalism but also in crafting the multiple modes of global
capitalism. This approach also posits a diﬀerent view of women’s agency, allowing it
to be seen in the context of diﬀerent structures. In her study of diﬀerent forms of
75 Deborah Stienstra, ‘Dancing Resistance from Rio to Beijing: Transnational Women’s Organizing
and United Nations Conferences 1992–6’, in Marchand and Runyan, Gender and Global
Restructuring; Alice Clark, Elisabeth Friedman and Katheryn Hochstetler, ‘The Sovereign Limits of
Global Civil Society: A Comparison of NGO participation in UN World Conferences on the
Environment, Human Rights and Women’, World Politics, 51:1 (1998), pp. 1–35.
76 Jacqui True and Michael Mintrom, ‘Transnational Networks and Policy Diﬀusion: The Case of
Gender Mainstreaming’, International Studies Quarterly, 45 (2001), pp. 27–57. Valerie Sperling,
Myra Marx Ferree and Barbara Risman, ‘Constructing Global Feminism: Transnational Advocacy
Networks and Russian Women’s Activism’, Signs, 26:4 (2001), pp. 1155–86.
77 Freeman, ‘Is Local’, p. 1013.
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transnational production in the borderlands of Mexico, Leslie Salzinger shows how
the construction of gender varies contextually as a result of the interaction between
actors (both female and male workers and managers) and the economic processes
associated with globalisation.78 Rather than seeing agency primarily in the context of
resisting globalisation, both these works highlight the importance of understanding
the ways in which women’s decisions interact with particular structures and
institutions at all levels and thereby helping to constitute those processes.
Second, analyses must bring together the analysis of the productive and repro-
ductive economies demonstrating how the two are inexorably linked, and that the
boundaries between them are not fixed but shifting, as is the related analytical
distinction between the public and the private. The ways in which these relationships
are being reconfigured is fundamental to globalisation. These interconnections have
led Chang and Ling to argue that globalisation has a dual nature in which global
restructuring (G1), associated with processes such as deregulation and privatisation,
rests on another kind of globalisation (G2) that depends on the provision of low
skilled menial intimate household services by low wage, highly sexualised and
racialised labour.79 It mirrors Young’s analysis of the contrasting roles played
by often highly paid professional women in hyper-mobile ‘money society’ and
those women in the territorially bounded ‘work society’ whose labour benefits
those better-oﬀ women through the ‘outsourcing of domestic production’ (the
(re-)emergence of the ‘mistress’ and the ‘maid’ in the first world).80 The restructuring
of the state and welfare systems that are seen as part of globalisation also have to be
analysed in terms of a reconfiguration of the productive and reproductive spheres, in
which tasks that were undertaken by the Keynesian welfare state are now the
responsibility of the household or the individual with hugely gendered implications.
It is clear therefore that the implicit gender assumptions of these ostensibly
gender-blind policies need also to be disentangled in these terms. As we have seen,
SAPs, despite their overt gender neutrality, have had very diﬀerent impacts on
diﬀerent groups of men and women. More profoundly than this, the models ignore
the sexual division of labour and the reproductive economy at the same time as
implicit within them is an assumption that women’s unpaid labour in the household
is infinitely elastic.81 This blindness has resulted in ‘ineﬃcient’ policy outcomes as
SAPs have not had the consequences policymakers intended, as for example women
producers have been unable to respond to market signals as intended.82
Although attempts to incorporate the analysis of reproduction and the private
sphere into IPE analyses that have not been undertaken by feminist scholars are rare,
it is possible to cite one non-feminist attempt to incorporate gender as an analytical
78 Leslie Salzinger, Genders in Production: Making Workers in Mexico’s Global Factories (Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press, 2003).
79 K. Chang and Lily Ling, ‘Globalization and Its Intimate Other: Filipina Domestic Workers in
Hong Kong’, in Marchand, and Runyan, Gender and Global Restructuring.
80 Brigitte Young, ‘Gender and Globalization: A European Perspective’, in Rita Mae Kelly et al.
(eds.), Gender, Globalization and Democratization (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield); B.
Young, ‘The ‘‘Mistress’’ and the ‘‘Maid’’ in the Globalized Economy’, Socialist Register (2001),
pp. 315–27.
81 Diane Elson, ‘Male Bias in Macro Economics: The Case of Structural Adjustment’, in Diane Elson
(ed.), Male Bias in the Development Process, 2nd edn. (Manchester: Manchester University Press,
1995).
82 Ingrid Palmer, ‘Gender Equity and Economic Eﬃciency in Adjustment Programmes’, in Afshar and
Dennis, Women and Adjustment Policies, pp. 69–83.
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category within comparative political economy. Esping Andersen has tried to
integrate the reproductive economy and its relationship to changes in the productive
economy into his analysis of post-industrial economies, as an important part of the
explanation of the problems that now beset welfare states in the national context.83
He argues that his earlier work had failed to recognise the importance of gender
diﬀerences, the role of the family and within that the role of women’s unpaid labour
in social reproduction, and as a result his analyses had serious flaws and made
satisfactory solutions diﬃcult to find. However, the solutions he then advocates are
not ones intended to promote women’s emancipation and gender equality (for
example by getting men to undertake more childcare) but to solve what he sees as
pressing problems within certain post-industrial economies.84
Conclusions
To return to Tickner’s famous phrase, troubled engagements still continue between
feminist and critical IPE. Part of the explanation lies in the power diﬀerentials
between the two that mean that the majority of critical IPE scholars can and do
ignore feminist writings with impunity.85 But this is not the whole story. Even those
who do attempt to deal with gender, misunderstand what it means to use it as an
analytical category. However, as the analysis of the IPE literature of globalisation has
shown, although critical IPE has not yet taken gender on board as an analytical
category, this would not be an impossible task. Critical IPE shares enough common
ontological and epistemological ground with some feminist approaches to make this
possible. However, in order to achieve this aim, critical IPE needs to broaden its
horizons and do a number of things. First, it needs to engage with the large, already
existing, gender literature that explores the complex nature of many aspects of these
processes, such as their contradictory impact on diﬀerent groups of women, their
ideational aspects and the variety and nature of women’s organising. At the moment
this wealth of research is almost completely ignored in all the IPE literature. Second,
critical IPE needs a much more sophisticated understanding of what a gendered
analysis entails. It is not enough to simply mention women in passing, for example
seeing women solely in the context of their resistance to globalisation or to ‘add
women in’ to existing categories as occasionally happens at the moment. Third, as an
extension of this, IPE needs to begin to utilise concepts that would enable it to use
gender as an analytical category. It is too narrowly focused on certain, often formal,
structures and processes to the exclusion of other informal ones, and too little
consideration is given to the construction of norms, rules, institutions and identities
and the ways in which they are gendered. The adoption of analytical frameworks that
incorporate gendered notions of interaction between the productive and reproductive
economies would contribute to this process, and facilitate more comprehensive
understandings of the complex processes of globalisation.
83 Goran Esping Andersen, The Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999).
84 This use of Esping Andersen’s work is not support for Charli Carpenter’s position (fn. 4).
85 Tickner has argued this for mainstream IR, ‘You Just Don’t Understand’, p. 629.
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